because so little was known about how European laws worked in practice. Today, improved transatlantic communication and the internet open up a wealth of information on current European insolvency processes. Europeans have studied and learned from U.S. bankruptcy law. Now we in the United States can and should learn from the innovative, thoughtful, and modern European approaches to relieving financially troubled consumers.
Part II of this Article explores the circumstances leading to consumer debt relief reform in Germany. It first reports statistics on the sources and volume of rising consumer indebtedness in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. Then it surveys the deficiencies among the various legal protections 2004) available to overburdened consumer debtors before the Insolvency Act went into force in 1999. Part III describes the German solution to the problem of rising consumer overindebtedness. It lays out the history and structure of the consumer-oriented provisions of the Insolvency Act, with special emphasis on the practical operation and reform of the new law over the first few years of its existence. Part III pays particular attention to the development of the multi-year payment obligation as a prerequisite for a discharge of unpaid debt. Part IV extracts three lessons for U.S. law reform based on the German experience. This Part focuses on the critical and perhaps surprising disconnect between theory and reality in the German law, as well as the implications of that disconnect for U.S. law reformers. Finally, Part V distills the German system to its essence, pointing out that the current U.S. and German systems of consumer debt relief are not very different in practice. Nonetheless, the fundamental distinction between the goals and effects of the two systems contains a final crucial lesson for the United States.
II. THE BLEAK SITUATION FOR GERMAN CONSUMER DEBTORS BEFORE

1999: RISING DEBT LOADS, INEFFECTIVE BANKRUPTCY LAWS, AND INSUFFICIENT PROPERTY PROTECTIONS
The number of Germans facing serious debt problems rose drastically in the 1980s and 1990S. 8 The volume of consumer credit-as well as the percentage of households taking on consumer debt-grew in Germany at an explosive rate following World War II, especially from 1968 onward. 9 A study commissioned to investigate the growing problem of excessive debt in Germany estimated that, in 1989, 1.2 million households--over 3% of the total number of householdsl'°-suffered from excessive debt." While USA 66 (1986) . Total consumer credit volume grew from less than 10 billion DM in 1967 to nearly 160 billion DM in 1984.
Id. at tbl. 1. To place this growth in context, the ratio of the total volume of consumer credit to the gross national product had risen from 0.2% in the late 1940s to 10% in 1984. Id. Credit card usage remained quite low,' 3 but Germans nonetheless incurred substantial debts, primarily through installment loans from finance companies and banks, as well as credit purchases from mail order companies.
14 Germans commonly took on debt to purchase furniture and other household items, as well as automobiles.'
5 Most troubling, a very large portion of consumer debt was incurred to pay off previous installment debt, leading many consumers into a vicious cycle of "chain indebtedness."' 6 Credit deregulation in the 1980s further accelerated the growth of consumer debt. Total consumer debt in Germany more than doubled again between 1984 and 1994, from just under DM 160 billion in 1984 to almost DM 364 billion in 1994.17 Job loss and other unexpected stress on income' 8 would throw the already sensitive economics of heavily some estimates. See GP-FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE, VERSCHULDUNG UND U0BERSCHULDUNG (2003) , http://gp-forschungsgruppe.com/de/tf ver.asp (last visited Jul. 8, 2003) . The total number of households has grown to just under 39 million, see STATISTISCHE BUNDESAMT, supra note 11 (which means that over 7% of households are overindebted in Germany today).
DETLEF BONNEMANN & THOMAS RICKAL, EINFUHRUNG IN DEN PROBLEMKREIS VER-/
OBERSCHULDUNG § 1 (1997), available at http://www.uni-essen.de/tts/lehrangebot/ verschuldung/schulden.pdf (last visited Jul. 2, 2003).
13 Estimates suggested that only 7.1% of the German population used credit cards by 1990 . See KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 78-82, 272 tbl. 38. " See id., at 52, 272 tbl. 38. Moderate-interest loans from banks are far more difficult for consumers to obtain than loans from finance companies and other credit suppliers, which leads a great many consumers to take on more expensive and riskier loans from finance companies and "shadier" lenders. See, e.g., Holzcheck, supra note 10, at 74-75. 15 See Holzcheck, supra note 9, at 70; KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 106, 272-73. The usage and structure of German consumer credit at the end of the 1980s was in many ways quite similar to consumer credit use in the United States in the early-to mid- 24:257 (2004) indebted consumers into a tailspin. German insolvency laws were unable to meet the challenges of this rising tide of consumer debt. Unlike the bankruptcy regimes of many European countries, German bankruptcy law has historically drawn no distinctions between consumers and "merchants."' 9 Anyone could take advantage of the two German laws dealing with debt relief. Under the Konkursordnung, 20 the debtor's assets were liquidated to produce a distribution to creditors, while the Vergleichsordnung 2 I sought to foster renegotiation of debtor-creditor relations by majority vote of creditors. Although both of these laws were technically available to consumers, neither generally offered consumers any benefit. These two laws were either practically unavailable or ineffectual for the overwhelming majority of consumer debtors for three reasons.
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First, both laws allowed consumers to seek a court-imposed settlement agreement, possibly settling debts for less than full payment, 22 but only with the assent of large majorities of creditors and, in most cases, a minimum payout from the debtor. To force a settlement on recalcitrant creditors, the Konkursordnung required the assent of a majority of the total number of creditors, and of creditors holding at least 75% of total claims. 23 The Vergleichsordnung imposed even more stringent requirements. In addition to convincing a majority of creditors and those holding between 75% and 80% of total claims, 24 the proposed settlement had to offer payment of at least 35% of all claims. 2 5 Consumers in particular were unlikely to be able to clear either the majority creditor assent hurdle or the minimum payment hurdle. 26 As a result, forced settlements under the Konkursordnung, and cases initiated under the Vergleichsordnung, represented only a miniscule percentage of all debt relief proceedings in Germany. 27 Second, a case could be opened under the Konkursordnung only if the debtor's available assets could be expected to cover the significant costs of the proceedings (including administrator's fees and court costs).
2 8 Most debtors-both consumers and businesses-were thus doomed to failure immediately out of the gate. This minimum assets requirement led to the dismissal of over 75% of all cases under the Konkursordnung. 29 One suspects that the vast majority of consumer cases fell within the doomed "insufficient assets" category. 26 See, e.g., Balz, supra note 23, at 253 (explaining that consumers might hope for a forced settlement only if third parties were willing to put up money to support the plan).
27 See, e.g., Balz, supra note 23, at 252-53 (pointing out that forced settlements under the Konkursordnung occurred in only 8% of all cases, and noting that the Vergleichsordnung had "lost more and more meaning since its entry into force," and that in the mid-1980s, fewer than 1% of insolvency cases were initiated under the Vergleichsordnung, the majority of which led to no agreement); Klaus Kamlah, The New German Insolvency Act: Finally, the most important deficiency of pre-1999 German bankruptcy law was that German law had never offered a forced discharge of unpaid debt at the conclusion of bankruptcy proceedings. 31 The Konkursordnung focused on facilitating the enforcement of creditors' claims, not on relieving the honest debtor of a heavy debt burden. 32 Following insolvency proceedings, all creditors included on the debtor's schedule of debts could receive a writ of execution, allowing them to seize the debtor's future property and future income, at any time for up to thirty years. 33 Thus, the German Konkursordnung relegated most consumer debtors to life-long indebtedness in the "modem debtor's prison. 34 Consequently, many such (2) and (4) (explaining that, because the GesO didn't offer a real "discharge," it failed to provide a way out of the "modem debtor's prison" or to provide incentive to pay creditors, and therefore should not be adopted in Germany as a whole following reunification). Moreover, the GesO suffered from the same problem as the Konkursordnung, in that courts dismissed "the great majority" of cases under the Bankruptcy Act because consumer debtors possessed insufficient assets to cover the costs of the proceeding. See id. at § § VI(5)(c), VII(1). Consumer debtors were thus consigned to "living in poverty" 36 under the meager protections of German law shielding certain property and income from seizure. 37 Even today, only a narrow range of consumer property remains outside the grasp of creditors seeking to execute judgments. German law exempts from seizure general personal and household items only "to the extent that they are required for the debtor's modest lifestyle and domestic activity, appropriate to his or her occupational activity and indebtedness," as well as items necessary for the debtor's profession .38 Indeed, if necessary items are overly "luxurious," such as a color television as opposed to a black-and-white television, they can be seized and replaced by the creditor with less luxurious alternatives.
39
The German property exemptions take seriously the word "modest," 40 placing virtually anything of significant value within reach of creditors. credit contracts assigning future wages and salary are legal so long as the purpose and extent of the assignment and the circumstances leading to enforcement of the assignment are adequately and clearly described, and the assignment leads to a reasonable balance of the interests of the parties); Balz, supra note 23, at 268-69 (noting that future wage and salary assignments are extremely common in Germany, while they are heavily restricted in countries like the United States, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland); cf 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7755-61 (1984) (outlawing most forms of future wage assignments in the United States as unfair trade practices).
43 See, e.g., KORCZAK & PFEFFERKORN, supra note 11, at 129 (describing future wage and salary assignment as "a widespread credit security measure" commonly inserted into credit contracts); Holzscheck, supra note 9, at 80 (noting that wage assignments are the most common out-of-court enforcement mechanism in Germany); Balz, supra note 23, at 268-69 (noting that "by far the largest portion of consumer credit" is secured by future wage and salary assignments); BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101 (expressing concern that future wages as a credit protection device should not be unduly limited); BESCHLUSSEMPFEHLUNGEN UND BERICHT DES RECHTSAUSSCHUSSES (6. AusscHuss) ZU DEM
GESETZENTWURF
DER BUNDESREGIERUNG-DRUCKSACHE per year, then adding 50% of wages between $6500 and $20,000. See BR-DR. 32/84, supra note 47, at 1, Art. 1(4) (exempting 1092 DM base per month plus 50% up to 3302 DM per month maximum). I have multiplied the monthly exemptions by 12 for easier comprehension by U.S. readers more familiar with annual income comparisons. The somewhat complicated German wage exemption scheme proceeds in three steps: First, it allots a base exemption in 100% of a certain amount of monthly wages, depending upon the number of people in the debtor's household (or a former household to whom the debtor owed a support obligation). Second, the debtor is then granted an exemption in a sliding percentage of monthly wages beyond the base exemption amount, again depending upon the number of his or her dependent obligations (30% for single people, 50% for those with one support obligation, and 10% more for each additional obligation up to a maximum of 5). Finally, all debtors are subject to the same maximum monthly wage beyond which all wages are fully seizable. Thus, single debtors with no dependent obligations receive 100% of a minimum amount plus 30% of excess wages up to the maximum, those with one dependent obligation (married debtors, for example) receive a slightly higher minimum 100% exempt absolute maximum of about $16,500 ler year. 49 All income above the maximum was available to creditors. A comparative analysis of the buying power of these sums in the United States and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to observe that a young couple would be hard-pressed to lead even a "modest" lifestyle on $16,500 per year in northern Europe. 5 1
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF A NONCONSENSUAL DISCHARGE FOR CONSUMER
DEBT
Consumers occupied a sort of no-man's land in German debt relief law before 1999. Lawmakers were loath to interfere with the consequences of bargains struck between debtors and creditors. They resisted the notion of allowing consumers to escape their debts other than by re-negotiating their agreements with creditors. Powerful economic change ultimately produced enough political pressure to bring consumer protection to the fore, and reformers introduced a revoluti6n in debtor-creditor relations-the discharge of unpaid debt. Such a potent legal remedy, though, had to be balanced by careful measures to avoid misuse. This Part describes the path from no discharge to a discharge in stages, subject to ostensibly heavy requirements. Part III.A describes the early stages of debt relief law reform in Germany, from resistance to acceptance of the notion of freeing debtors from unpaid debt. Part III.B describes in detail the series of stages through which a consumer debt relief case passes under the new Insolvency Act. This part examines the past, present, and likely future provisions of the new law. Finally, Part III.C looks to the future of German consumer debt relief amount plus 50% of excess wages up to the maximum, and those with two through five exemptions (married debtors with one through four children, for example) receive a steadily increasing minimum exemption plus 60% through 90% of excess wages (10% for each dependent obligation up to the fifth) up to the maximum. 
A. Early History and Resistance to the Concept of Discharge
The plight of overburdened consumers drew no attention in the earliest bankruptcy reform efforts in Germany.
5 2 The oil crisis of 1973 and its widespread negative consequences for business originally sparked the movement for reform, when in 1978 the German Minister of Justice appointed a commission to study the bankruptcy laws and recommend much needed change. 3 The Commission on Insolvency Law issued two reports, one in 1985 and the other in 1986. 54 The first report contained no mention of any issue relating to corisumnr indebtedness, focusing instead on the desperate need for reform in big business insolvency proceedings and secured transactions law. 55 The second report dealt with an issue of central concern to consumers-the post-bankruptcy discharge of debt-but it concluded that "a discharge after the Anglo-American model is out of the question. '56 The Commission adhered firmly and unanimously to the notion that debtors could escape their unpaid debts only by agreement with creditors. Bankruptcy law served in the first instance to facilitate creditor'enforcement of the debtor's obligations, the Commission insisted, "it is in no way to function as a 'debt-divestiture proceeding' to help the debtor to rid himself of his obligations., 58 The Commission recognized that some form of expanded protection against judgment enforcement might be appropriate for consumers, but it demurred as to such questions, as they fell within "a problem of consumer protection, especially in connection with consumer credit, which has no immediate relationship to insolvency law reform." Id.; Gerhardt, supra note 32, at 143 (explaining that a provision dealing with the social and socio-political problems of post-bankruptcy indebtedness seemed inappropriate to connect with bankruptcy law). The Kohl Administration disagreed, explaining in its proposed bill that "insolvency law must also make a contribution" to overcoming the increasing problem of consumer overindebtedness. See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 104. The push to move provisions for discharge out of the insolvency law and into an independent Political change undermined the Commission's views, and the discharge of debt following insolvency proceedings-especially for consumers-became an essential plank in the platform of insolvency law reform. In 1986, a national election brought to power a new Minister of Justice who prioritized the implementation of a discharge of personal liability following bankruptcy. 6° In December 1988, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Youth, Family, Women and Health commissioned a research group to investigate the growing problem of consumer overindebtedness in Germany. 6 ' The commission's 1989 report on the explosion of consumer debt and its dire consequences 62 supported the introduction of new discharge provisions into the bill for a new insolvency 63 4 law, which was finally introduced into the Bundesrat on January 3, 1992.
The first section of the proposed new law announced that the goals of insolvency proceedings would henceforth encompass not only equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among creditors, but also the opportunity for "[t]he honest debtor.., to free himself of his remaining debts. 6 bill continues in the lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag, through three "readings," or analyses and debates, beginning with referral to committee, which constitutes the most extensive and exacting stage of the legislative process. See id The bill as passed by the Bundestag must be approved by the Bundesrat, sometimes after a conference committee hammers out remaining differences between the two chambers of Parliament. See id. This occurred for the Insolvency Act as well, but the conference committee essentially ignored the Bundesrat's objections and re-proposed the bill to both houses in summer 1994 with only a minor modification; i.e., that the bill's entry into force be delayed almost five years to 65 BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 10. 2004) to be expected from creditor enforcement action were far offset by the economic costs to debtors forced into life-long indebtedness and eking out a lean existence with exempt wages. 66 The discharge was viewed as a social necessity. Because the former bankruptcy law lacked a discharge, 67 and agreements with creditors were the rare exception, 6 8 society in general suffered a detriment. Many debtors were forced into the shadow economy of the black market, if they were not pushed out of productive economic life entirely. 69 The concept of a discharge of debt found support in a growing trend among other European nations.
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0 The German version would chart a middle path between the "debtor-friendly" Anglo-American law and the life-long liability of former German law. 7 ' Reformers hoped that the possibility of a discharge would raise debtor morale and offer new hope for an economic new beginning, 7 2 which would redound to the benefit of society by returning debtors to productive activity and tax-paying status. Failing that, the debtor can file a petition to open an insolvency case, but then must make another attempt at a payment plan with creditors. 78 This time, the court can impose the plan on a non-consenting minority of creditors if a majority in both number and total amount of claims is deemed to agree to the plan. 79 Third, if a majority of creditors cannot be enticed or forced into a plan, simplified liquidation proceedings ensue, seeking to realize value from the debtor's nonexempt assets.80 Finally, the debtor confronts the most significant hurdle, a six-year payment period, during which the debtor must exert her best efforts to obtain gainful employment and turn over all nonexempt income to a trustee for distribution to creditors. 8 1 This Part explores the development and application of these steps in greater detail. Part B. 1 describes the long and seldom fruitful process of haggling over a debt arrangement plan, both in and out of court. Part B.2 very briefly describes the "simplified liquidation proceeding" used to extract value from the debtor's current assets. Finally, Part B.3 examines the volatile history and implementation of the six-year payment period preceding the final discharge of remaining unpaid debt.
Out-of-Court and Court-Directed Debt Arrangement Plan Negotiations
The main goal in German consumer insolvency law is to encourage and facilitate the execution of fair out-of-court debt arrangement The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief 24:257 (2004) agreements among debtors and creditors. 82 To this end, the Insolvency Act requires debtors to make two attempts to forge a reasonable payment arrangement with creditors. A consumer insolvency case begins in Germany with the debtor's attempt to reach a consensus with all creditors on an out-of-court renegotiation of claims. 83 In negotiating this plan, the debtor must be supported by a "suitable person or office.
84
The "suitable person or office" thus plays a crucial role in this first step, and the extraordinary demands on and insufficient numbers of such people have created serious bottlenecks in the system from the beginning. The Ldnder (individual German States) determine which "persons or agencies" are suitable, 8 5 and the two most common such persons are lawyers and state-sponsored debt counselors. 86 Due to poor financial support from the Ldnder, 8 9 the debt counseling centers are unable to provide sufficient personnel to support the masses of debtors seeking entry into the insolvency relief process. 0 In the early years after passage of the Insolvency Act, debtors at about half of these centers had to wait two to eight weeks for a first appointment, while waiting periods at the other centers stretched from three months to a year. 9 ' Indeed, some debt counseling centers had to turn away those seeking help by mid-92 2000, as their waiting lists had simply grown too long. Far fewer cases were opened in the first two years under the Insolvency Act than had been expected, 93 and these long waiting periods for support in the out-of-court first stage of the process represented a major cause of the dearth of cases. www.infodienst-schuldnerberatung.de/praxisthema/andrang/andrang.html (reporting that waiting periods up to a year were reported to be "the norm rather than the exception" after the entry into force of the Insolvency Act); RATH, supra note 17, at § 4.3; see also court-driven part of the insolvency process begins with another, in-court attempt to negotiate an agreed payment plan. This time, the court can force a dissenting minority of creditors into a plan if a majority of both total number of creditors and amount of claims either votes in favor of the plan or fails to vote within one month after service of the plan documents.' 0 In addition, two other conditions must be met. In order for the court to "cram down" 106 a plan on dissenting minority creditors, the proposed plan must offer each creditor an appropriate share in relation to other creditors, and dissenting creditors may not be placed in a worse economic position than they would occupy were the case to continue through the liquidation and six-year payment period. 0 7 The early yield of court-imposed payment plans was much lower-only about 1.5% of all consumer cases filed in 1999, for example, ended with a court-brokered plan.' 0 8 Once again, I was unable to locate any statistics reporting on successful completion of payments under such plans.
This second stage of in-court plan negotiation is destined for elimination and integration into the out-of-court process in the near future. Dedication to the court-driven plan process has been rapidly eroding from the outset. The federal-state (Bund-Ldnder) working group commissioned by the Ministry of Justice to study consumer insolvency in its early stages concluded that the in-court plan process often represented a "pure formality," and it pointed out a long string of commentaries criticizing the process.'09 "In many proceedings," the group's report revealed, "it is clear from the beginning that the necessary majority of creditors supporting the plan cannot be achieved," particularly when, as is often the case, the debtor has no nonexempt income to offer creditors in the plan, or one large creditor over 20% of creditor claims, while the creditors stood to collect nothing in insolvency proceedings from the debtors with no non-exempt income. 
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24:257 (2004) refuses to support the plan." 0 1 The representative from Saxony considered the in-court process senseless and would have eliminated it immediately,"'I but the working group," 2 the Administration," 3 and ultimately the German Parliament" 4 agreed to make the process optional-with the option to be exercised by the court." 5 As it turned out, most courts opted out of the incourt plan process and hardly undertook any further in-court plan proceedings.
The latest reform proposal from the Administration, therefore, essentially throws in the towel on the "largely meaningless"" ' 7 in-court plan process.
8 It reinforces the earlier out-of-court process, which now fails if even one creditor dissents, by integrating the court-imposed "cram-down" provisions into the out-of-court stage. The reform would allow" 9 the debtor to petition the court-before an insolvency case has been initiatedto deem an out-of-court plan accepted if the requisite majority of creditors approves the plan or fails to respond in a timely manner to the plan proposal.
20 If a majority of creditors rejects the out-of-court plan, or if the debtor chooses not to seek "cram-down," the debtor will be able to initiate an insolvency case and proceed immediately to simplified insolvency proceedings-the current second round of (in-court) plan review and voting will be disposed of.' 2 ' Given the Administration's record of success in moving its consumer insolvency reform proposals through Parliament, one suspects that the in-court plan process will remain in place no more than 110 BUND-LANDER-ARBEITSGRUPPE, supra note 87, at § § (B)(I)(3)(a)(aa), (C)(3); Pape, supra note 87, at 2040-42.
I" See id. at § (B)(I)(3)(a)(bb).
Id.
113 See BR-DR. 14/01, supra note 73, at 9, 27-28, 65-68 (calling the in-court plan process a "naked formality" in many cases). one more year. 1 22 Unfortunately, this will exacerbate the strain on already overburdened debt counseling centers,1 23 and waiting periods for access to counseling-and consequently for formal insolvency relief-will grow even longer.
Simplified liquidation proceedings
If creditors refuse a payment plan, the formal insolvency case begins with a "simplified liquidation proceeding," in which a court-appointed trustee sells the debtor's nonexempt assets to produce funds for distribution to creditors. 124 126 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; see also InsO § 36 (excluding exempt assets from the insolvency estate). In a consumer information pamphlet published by the Ministry of Justice, the hypothetical example of a consumer insolvency proceeding includes a debtor with no available assets, acknowledging that the no-asset case is the norm. See of all consumer cases were dismissed under this provision "for lack of assets." 130 A dismissed case meant then, and still means now, that there is no discharge and no relief for the debtor.
Development of and debate over the "Good Behavior Period"
A German consumer insolvency case concludes with the final, most hotly debated, and most burdensome "strict prerequisite" for relief-the socalled "good behavior period" (Wohlverhaltensperiode). In addition to giving up all nonexempt assets in the preceding stage, for six years beginning with the opening of the simplified insolvency proceedings, the debtor must assign to a trustee all nonexempt work-related income13 and turn over to the trustee half of the value of any property acquired by inheritance.
132 Once each year, the trustee distributes ratably to creditors any income assigned during that year. years of the six-year period, the trustee pays the debtor an incentive bonus of 10% of the debtor's nonexempt wages assigned during the year; the debtor receives a bonus of 15% of nonexempt income for holding out for five years. 134 At the end of the sixth year, the debtor is released from most remaining debts. 1 35 In a rather innovative step, the Insolvency Act enhances the possibility of payments to creditors1 36 by demanding the debtor's best efforts to find and hold a job. Pursuant to "one of the central provisions"' 37 testing the debtor's six years of "good behavior," the debtor must hold-or actively seek and not refuse to accept-any suitable employment.1
38 If the debtor fails to seek and hold reasonable employment, creditors can petition the court for denial of discharge.
139 If the debtor remains jobless despite her best efforts, she does not lose her discharge, but the debtor must exert more effort to find an acceptable job than simply relying on an employment agency.
140 Indeed, the drafters emphasized that "reasonableness" in this context is subject to "intense demands."' 141 The debtor must be ready to take on work outside her profession, even temporary work if need be.
142
For example, a consumer information pamphlet published by the Ministry of Justice describes a hypothetical consumer insolvency case in which the debtor, Mr. Honest (Herr Redlich), loses his job as a printer and takes on a low-wage job as a janitor.
143 The hypothetical story explains that Mr.
admitted that this represents a "considerable position of advantage" for creditors with wage assignments and pledges. See BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 101; see also BR-DR. 1/1/92, supra note 18, at 39. 134 See InsO § 292(1). 135 See id. at § 300. Some debts are not affected by discharge. See id. at § 302. German law accepts far fewer debts from discharge than U.S. law does, however. Only three types of debt are not affected by the discharge in Germany: intentional tort liability, monetary fines and penalties, and the obligation to pay insolvency court costs and fees deferred under InsO § 4a. See id. at § 302; cf 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and (7) (2003) (excepting similar debts from discharge under U.S. bankruptcy law). Under U.S. law, in contrast, a wide variety of additional debts are not dischargeable, such as recent overdue taxes, past-due child support and alimony obligations, debts for money or property obtained by fraud, education loan debt, and liability for bodily injury or death resulting from drunk driving. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2003). Thus, although the German law demands more from the debtor, it also offers a broader discharge to the debtor. The drafters of the Insolvency Act joined other European nations in their desire to avoid the U.S. model of consumer insolvency relief, under which simply undergoing one-time liquidation proceedings leads to discharge in most cases.
145
The earliest European proposals for implementing consumer insolvency relief included multi-year payment periods to ensure that the debtor "exert [s] himself to the fullest to earn the premium, a discharge of the remainder of the debts.'
' 146 These proposals suggested a maximum term of four years of payments, so as to avoid flagging debtor morale and failure of overly long plans.
147
Emerging European approaches to consumer bankruptcy generally eschew the "getout-of-jail-free" approach of the U.S. system in favor of discharge conditioned on completion of a several-year payment period.
148 Indeed, it has been suggested that the "too lenient reputation of U.S. consumer bankruptcy law makes the word ['bankruptcy'] repugnant to some Europeans."
49
Consistent with the general European attitude, the first legislative proposal for the German Insolvency Act remarked emphatically that the "very debtor-friendly" model of Anglo-American law would not be adopted.
150
Instead, requiring the debtor to assign several years of nonexempt income and endeavor to obtain and hold suitable employment would serve a "warning function" to protect the courts from a flood of frivolous and abusive petitions, ensuring that discharge would be available only to those debtors ready and willing to give up their garnishable income and confront the deprivations of seven 5 ' lean years. 5 2 The discharge itself was designed in part to motivate the debtor "into honest and creditorfriendly behavior."
The drafters explicitly described the discharge as a ''privilege" to be earned by the debtor's accepting any suitable employment '44 Id. at 37. 141 See, e.g., BR-DR. 1/92, supra note 8, at 188. 146 Huls, Towards a European Approach, supra note 88, at 220, 226-28. 147 Id. at 221, 228 (noting that four years "seems to be the maximum period for which consumers are willing and able to expose themselves to the limitations of a plan"). In addition, the drafters of the Insolvency Act were influenced by the writings and economic theories of Thomas Jackson. 155 In his famous examination of the policies underlying the discharge of debt, for example, Professor Jackson questioned the economic soundness of ignoring the valuable property interest in the "human capital" of a consumer debtor's future earning capacity, as U.S. consumer bankruptcy law generally leaves only existing, tangible assets available to creditors. 5 6 German commentators seized on this "inconsistency" in U.S. law, even using Jackson's terminology of "human capital."' 57 Because credit extensions to consumers are made not on the basis of present assets, but on the basis of future earning capacity, these commentators argued that the German insolvency regime should acknowledge and facilitate the role of future earnings in the consumer credit bargain and require "liquidation" of at least part of that "asset" for creditors.
1 58 This analysis eventually made its way into the legislative grounding for the Insolvency Act. Lawmakers designed the requirement of an extended period of payment from future wages in part to keep pace with developments in the modem consumer credit economy, in which future wages play an integral role in the extension of consumer credit. 5 9
b. Debate about the Length of the Good Behavior Period
The German Parliament never questioned the notion of a multi-year payment period, but it examined and fiercely debated the length of the period. When it introduced the bill for the new Insolvency Law, the Kohl Administration chose seven years as the appropriate length of time, 160 although no one ever offered any explanation for this choice. ' The Bundesrat Law Committee immediately suggested that the seven-year period was "unequivocally too long," and proposed a reduction to four 
The Innovative German Approach to Consumer Debt Relief
24:257 (2004) years.
16
The Committee suggested that such long "re-socialization" periods were expected only of criminals. 163 But a majority of the full Bundesrat re jected this proposal by voice vote without comment or explanation.1
The Social Democrats 165 continued the fight in the Bundestag, arguing for a term of as little as three years. In the first consideration of the bill, the Social Democrats attacked the seven-year period as "in most cases too long.' ' 166 They admitted that they themselves had proposed a seven-year period when the idea of a consumer discharge arrived on the legislative front in 1988, but they had backed away from the longer period based on reports from debt counseling centers. 167 Consequently, the Social Democrats filed an alternative proposal 68 based on their finding that "[t]he practice of the debt counseling centers shows that debt arrangement plans with terms of longer than four or five years are predestined to failure."' ' 69 Accordingly, the Social Democrats submitted that the good behavior period should last in normal cases five years, but it could be reduced to three or raised to seven based on the degree of the debtor's fault for finding herself in debt.17 0 Rather than reducing the term of the good behavior period, the Bundestag accepted a committee proposal to boost the debtor's motivation to complete the seven-year period. The Bundestag Law Committee added so-called "motivation rebates"'' 1 to be paid to the debtor from nonexempt income assigned to the trustee. At the end of the fourth, fifth, and sixth 24:257 (2004) years of the period, the debtor would receive "rebates" of 10%, 15%, and 20%, respectively, of her annual assigned nonexempt income. 7 2 The full Bundestag adopted the Law Committee's approach and rejected the Social Democrats' proposal. 173 Thus, the law began with a seven-year 74 "good behavior period," with the debtor's motivation buttressed by rebates of nonexempt income beginning after four years.
c. Reduction of Length and Payments Over the Good Behavior Period
Despite continuing harsh criticism and opposition, the lengthy good behavior period has stubbornly resisted meaningful reform. Demands for a reduction to five years have continued unheeded. 175 Nevertheless, in December 2001, the German Parliament ultimately reformed the period in two less extensive-but still important-ways.
First, the term was finally reduced to six years. In its 2001 reform proposal, the Administration was unwilling to recommend a reduction in the seven-year term without further study of the effect of such a reform on distributions to creditors and on the availability of consumer credit.' 76 An angry reaction quickly ensued from consumer debtor representatives.
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They pointed out the lack of any apparent reasoning for the choice of seven years, and they noted that other European nations had implemented payment periods of only fouryears. 78 The former Communists, now called the Democratic Socialists,1 79 had already taken up the fight in 2000, introducing a formal proposal to reduce the "good behavior period" to five years to avoid the "demotivation" of the debtor by such a long period. Indeed, the Democratic Socialists and others pointed out that the total period from the beginning of out-of-court negotiations to the end of the insolvency case could extend as long as nine to eleven years in some cases due to delays in the early stages of the process.'18 A middle path once again emerged, as the Bundestag reduced the good behavior period to six years and tied the beginning of the period to the opening, rather than the conclusion, of the simplified insolvency proceedings. 82 It was hoped that these two changes would lead to "a significant lightening of the burden on debtors," while studies of the Institute for Financial Services suggested only minimal ill effects for creditors and the general availability of consumer credit. 83 Achieving even this minimal reduction in the good behavior period required great effort, and it was introduced into the bill the night before final committee debate. 1 84 The second easing of the burden of the good behavior period is easy to miss but potentially far more significant. At the same time that it slightly reduced the term of the good behavior period, the German Parliament significantly reduced the amount of income that creditors can seize from debtors, including during the six-year good behavior period.1 85 Beginning January 1, 2002, the minimum statutory wage exemption rose nearly 50% for single debtors and childless couples, which constitute the overwhelming majority of German households, 186 and between 30% and 40% for debtors with children. 187 Similarly, the maximum exempt amount for all debtors' 192 This is obviously no king's ransom, but it is a much more solid foundation for a modest lifestyle. Consumer debtor advocates praised the resulting "perceptible financial relief' offered by the long-needed increase. 193 Insolvency advisors and judges report that, after the increase in exemptions, very few consumer insolvency cases involve any distribution at all to creditors-either from the debtor's current assets or from six years of future income.' 2°°W ord of mouth about the potential of the new law will undoubtedly lead to greater interest. For example, one debtor wrote to an internet chatgroup that his first year of the good behavior period was not as bad as he had expected, that he had no more fear of the next several years, and "[e]verything is going well for me for the first time in my life. ' '2 1 With estimates of nearly 2.8 million overindebted households in Germany, 20 2 the well of potential consumer insolvency cases will not run dry for a very long time.
Reformers have implemented the most substantial changes in consumer insolvency law already, so they promise no more radical changes in the future. The Ministry of Justice, the primary mover of insolvency law reform up to this point, has made its position quite clear: "There will be no radical about-turn or paradigm shift in consumer insolvency proceedings or in the discharge. 20 3 The Justice Ministry has already rejected a string of 231 and that minimum 100% exemption grows if the couple has " 132 has children.
In contrast, a U.S. couple with no children or ten children is generally subject to the same minimum exemption of just over $8,000 per year. 233 A U.S. debtor would have to make $22,667 to keep the same minimum $17,000 as her German counterpart.
2 34 The U.S. wage exemption scheme is far more favorable to higher income levels than the German scheme, 235 but low income is precisely the problem for most overindebted consumers. The plain fact is that consumer debtors do not pay because they cannot pay, not because they do not want to. The German experience further confirms this.
With relatively low wage exemptions and welfare benefits, U.S. consumers are generally more susceptible to economic volatility. Generous state welfare benefits and a relatively high wage exemption offer German debtors a substantial chance for successful completion of the six-year good behavior period. U.S. debtors are less likely than Germans to be able to complete such a multi-year payment term. This conclusion is borne out by 229 See, e.g., U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 2, Social Welfare, Health Care, and Education. 230 See supra note 194. 231 See supra note 192. 232 See supra note 48 (describing the three-stage German wage exemption scheme). 234 U.S. law exempts 75% of income higher than minimum wage, and $17,000 is 75% of $22,667. See id. 235 The U.S. wage exemption law contains no maximum wage beyond which all income is seizable, as the German law does, and U.S. law exempts 75% of wages higher than the minimum, while German law protects only 30% of excess wages for individual debtors, and 50%-90% for debtors with between one and five dependents. See supra note 49. 
V. IF THEY CAN'T PAY, WHAT'S THE POINT? THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON
The consumer provisions of the German Insolvency Act received the following hearty praise from Alfred Hartenbach, a Social Democratic member of the Bundestag who, incidentally, served as a judge presiding over bankruptcy cases between 1985 and 1994:
The people get something from it, as their feeling of self-worth rises. The children of these people get something from it, as it must be, I believe, one of the worst experiences when one must grow up in an overindebted household as a child in poverty. The cities and communities get something from it, because they have to pay fewer social welfare benefits. The Ldnder and the Federation also get something from it, because taxes will be collected again. Thus, we have created an all-around reasonable law here.
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A benefit for creditors is conspicuously absent from this acclaim for the Insolvency Act. German lawmakers have created an impressive set of theoretical benefits and trade-offs, which demands a carefully balanced quid pro quo of debtors and creditors affected by consumer bankruptcy. But the real "quids" and the real "quos" prove a bit imbalanced upon closer inspection under the lens of actual practice.
At least theoretically, consumer debtors give up any valuable nonexempt property, as well as six years of nonexempt future income. Perhaps more importantly from a social-responsibility perspective, debtors sacrifice the uninhibited right to choose whether to work and what job to take on-they are forced to acknowledge that others depend on their responsible attitude toward producing income. Even if this income is insufficient to produce any return to creditors, the law impresses on debtors a strong sense of responsibility for dealing with their financial affairs. No one is forced to work, of course, but if debtors want the "quo" of the highly beneficial discharge of unpaid debt, they must offer the "quid" of at least a responsible attempt at creating income for settlement of debt.
Despite what appears to be a rather creditor-friendly consumer insolvency system, most creditors get the short end of the stick in Germany. Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 535 (1993) (citing failures in between 35% and 80% of confirmed Chapter 13 plans); THERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 217 (1989) (citing plan failure in 70% of Chapter 13 cases).
